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ABSTRACT: The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 explicitly increased Medicare payments to private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans. As a result, MA plans have, for the past
six years, been paid more for their enrollees than they would be expected to cost in traditional fee-for-service Medicare. Payments to MA plans in 2009 are projected to be 13
percent greater than the corresponding costs in traditional Medicare—an average of $1,138
per MA plan enrollee, for a total of $11.4 billion. Although the extra payments are used to
provide enrollees additional benefits, those benefits are not available to all beneficiaries—
but they are financed by general program funds. If payments to MA plans were instead
equal to the spending level under traditional Medicare, the more than $150 billion in savings over 10 years could be used to finance improved benefits for the low-income elderly
and disabled, or for expanding health-insurance coverage.
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The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) included a broad set of provisions intended to expand the role of private health plans in Medicare. Included
among these were increased payments to private health plans.
The higher level of payments for Medicare Advantage (MA) private plans
was based on a belief that, following an upfront investment to stabilize plan participation and increase beneficiary enrollment, “private plans and competition
will help drive down the explosive growth of Medicare spending.”1 However,
since 2004, the MMA policies have resulted in substantial extra payments—that
is, payments that exceed comparable costs in traditional fee-for-service Medicare.
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As estimates began to indicate the magnitude of
the extra payments to MA plans, Congress’s perspective on these payment polices shifted.2 The Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 used savings from phasing out
MA budget-neutral risk adjustment (see discussion
below) to offset the costs of deferring a scheduled
reduction in Medicare payments to physicians. The
Children’s Health and Medicare Protection Act passed
by the House of Representatives in 2007 contained
provisions (which did not become law) that would
have used a complete phaseout of MA extra payments
to finance improved benefits for low-income Medicare
beneficiaries, to defer additional physician payment
cuts, and to improve benefits for low-income children
in the State Children’s Health Insurance Program.
The Medicare Improvements for Patients and
Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA), enacted in July 2008,
used savings from a phaseout of double payments to
MA plans for indirect medical education costs (see
below) to finance the deferral of additional scheduled
reductions in physician payments. MIPPA also provided that, for the first time, most Private Fee-forService MA plans must, by January 2011, have contracts with physicians and other providers (i.e., establish provider networks).
As the Obama administration and the 111th
Congress prepared to take office, more attention
focused on MA overpayments. In fall 2008, the Obama
campaign said: “We need to eliminate the excessive
subsidies to Medicare Advantage plans and pay them
the same amount it would cost to treat the same
patients under regular Medicare.”3 More recently, the
president said: “We are spending a lot of money subsidizing the insurance companies around something
called Medicare Advantage, a program that gives them
subsidies to accept Medicare recipients but doesn’t
necessarily make people on Medicare healthier.”4 In
November 2008, Senator Max Baucus, chair of the
Senate Finance Committee, also called for the elimination of extra payments to MA plans: “Congress must
act to level the playing field between traditional
Medicare and Medicare Advantage payments and the
Baucus plan would do so.”5

The analysis in this paper updates our previous
work on this issue6 by using the latest data from
February 2009 on actual enrollment in MA plans and
on MA county benchmark payment rates for 2009 to
estimate the extra payments made to MA plans in that
year relative to what the same enrollees would have
cost under traditional fee-for-service Medicare.7 Based
on those data, we calculate that payments to MA plans
in 2009 exceed local fee-for-service costs by 13 percent, or an average of $1,138 for each of the 10 million Medicare enrollees in managed care,8 for a national
total of $11.4 billion.9 This represents a 34 percent
increase in MA extra payments from 2008 to 2009.10
In the six years since the MMA was enacted,
from 2004 to 2009, extra payments to MA plans are
estimated to total nearly $44 billion.11

MA Plan Payments in 2009
Medicare payments to MA plans in 2009 are based on
four factors:
1. The setting of county-level benchmark rates
according to rules specified in the MMA and subsequent legislation;
2. The inclusion of the fee-for-service payment
adjustment for indirect medical education (IME)
costs in the benchmark rates;
3. A budget-neutral risk-adjustment (BNRA) policy
that was put in place to offset the impact of risk
adjustment on MA payments; and
4. The submission of bids that represent the payment
each plan would require to provide traditional
Medicare benefits to its enrollees.
Medicare’s payments to each plan are determined by comparing the bid submitted by the plan
with the benchmark rate in each county it serves, as
described below.
County Benchmark Rates. For 2009, the benchmark
value used to establish payment rates for MA plans in
each county is set at the highest of eight reference
rates. The first four are based on payment levels
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established in March 2004, trended forward to 2009;
the other four are based on per capita fee-for-service
spending in a base year, trended forward to 2009. The
eight reference rates used to set the MA benchmark
rate for each county are:
•

A minimum rate, or floor, for large urban areas
(areas with populations of more than 250,000),
which in 2009 is set at $9,738 per enrollee
annually.

•

A floor for rural and smaller urban areas, which
in 2009 is set at $8,811 per enrollee annually.

•

A blended rate, which is a 50–50 combination
of the base MA plan payment rate for the
county in 2004 and the national average MA
plan payment rate in that year, updated to
2009.12

•

A rate that reflects a minimum increase from
the county’s MA plan payment level in 2004,
updated to 2009.13,14

•

A payment rate equal to 100 percent of estimated county per capita spending under traditional fee-for-service Medicare in 2004, updated
to 2009.15

•

A payment rate equal to 100 percent of estimated county per capita spending under traditional Medicare in 2005, updated to 2009.16

•

A payment rate equal to 100 percent of estimated county per capita spending under traditional Medicare in 2007, updated to 2009. 16

•

A payment rate equal to 100 percent of projected county per capita spending under traditional Medicare in 2009. 16

Because the benchmark rate for each county is
the highest of these eight reference rates—which
includes 100 percent of projected fee-for-service
spending in 2009—that benchmark rate is, by definition, at least as high as what spending would have
been expected to be for its enrollees had they been
enrolled in traditional Medicare. On average, the
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county benchmark rates exceed projected fee-for-service spending by 16.7 percent in 2009.
Inclusion of Indirect Medical Education Payments
in Benchmark Rates. The MMA in 2003 explicitly
provided that the calculation of the MA benchmark
rate for each county should include an amount that
reflects payments made under traditional Medicare to
teaching hospitals for their indirect medical education
costs, despite the fact that Medicare separately makes
IME payments directly to teaching hospitals for MA
enrollees admitted to those hospitals, under a policy
enacted in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
Medicare therefore effectively pays twice for
IME costs related to MA plan members.17 What’s
more, while the direct payment goes to the teaching
hospitals for which it is intended, the amount included
in the calculation of the benchmark rate goes only to
the plan. Whether that amount is, in the end, passed on
to the teaching hospitals that serve the plan’s enrollees
depends on the payment rates negotiated between each
of those hospitals and the plan; but in any case, it is a
double payment, because IME payments are made
directly to the hospital. This double payment raises
MA plan payments by about 2.2 percent in 2009.
The MIPPA legislation gradually phases out this
component of MA payment rates beginning in 2010.
This policy provides that the amount of IME payments
to plans in each county will be reduced by 0.6 percentage points a year until it is eliminated. This provision,
of course, will have no effect on MA payments in
2009. But even if the full effect of eliminating the double payment for IME were in place in 2009, MA plan
payments would still exceed corresponding fee-for-service costs by 10.8 percent.
It should also be noted that, in an arrangement
similar to the additional payments that teaching hospitals receive from Medicare for their IME costs, hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of indigent
patients receive a disproportionate share hospital
(DSH) adjustment to their fee-for-service Medicare
payments. While DSH payments are included in the
payment rates for MA plans, no DSH payments are
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made directly to hospitals for MA patients; it is left to
each plan to determine how much of the DSH amount,
if any, it will pay to the hospitals that its enrollees use.
Medicare DSH payments are generally not related to
the costs that individual plans face, and an argument
could be made that they, like IME payments, should be
removed from the MA payment rates and instead be
paid directly to eligible hospitals for the MA patients
they treat. Because a good estimate is not available for
the county-level effect of DSH payments on MA payment rates, they are not included in the calculations in
this analysis. However, they could be considered as
representing additional overpayments to MA plans.
Budget-Neutral Risk-Adjustment (BNRA) Policy.
Medicare adjusts its payments to MA plans for each
beneficiary who enrolls by a risk-adjustment factor
that accounts for variation in beneficiaries’ health status and other determinants of the expected cost of providing care to different enrollees. Because the riskadjustment factor reflects variation in expected costs
across the entire Medicare population, and because
enrollees in MA plans tend to be healthier than the
average Medicare beneficiary, risk adjustment has the
effect of reducing total MA plan payments.
Improvements in the risk-adjustment mechanism to
provide more accurate adjustments, mandated in the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997, were phased in beginning in 2000. To counteract the potential adverse effect
on MA plan payments, the BNRA policy was implemented in 2003. This policy applied an across-theboard increase to MA payment rates in every county to
offset reductions resulting from improved risk adjustment. With the application of the BNRA, the riskadjustment mechanism could affect the distribution of
MA payments across beneficiaries and plans, but
aggregate MA payments would be unaffected. In 2005,
the BNRA policy increased MA payments in every
county by 4 percent.18
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provided for
a phaseout of this increase in MA benchmark rates,
with only 55 percent of the BNRA applied in 2007, 40
percent in 2008, 25 percent in 2009, and 5 percent in

2010. By 2011, MA payment rates will no longer be
adjusted by this factor.19 In 2009, the BNRA policy
will add approximately $900 million to MA payments.20
MA Plan Bidding Mechanism. Under the bidding
mechanism established by the MMA, each MA plan
submits a bid to represent the payment amount it
would require for providing traditional Medicare benefits to its enrollees. The bid submitted by each plan is
compared with the benchmark rate in each county it
serves, and each plan receives from Medicare a payment rate equal to the benchmark rate (if its bid is
equal to or greater than the benchmark rate), or its bid
plus a “rebate” of 75 percent of the difference between
the benchmark rate and the bid (if its bid is less than
the benchmark rate). For plans with bids greater than
the benchmark rate, Medicare beneficiaries must pay
the difference between the bid and the benchmark to
enroll in the plan. Plans with bids less than the benchmark rate must either provide benefits beyond what is
covered by traditional Medicare or provide for a
reduction in enrollees’ out-of-pocket payments equal
in actuarial value to the amount of the “rebate” payment. However, while these additional benefits may be
attractive to MA plan enrollees—and, in fact, are
thought to be the primary factor in spurring the sharp
increase in MA enrollment over the past few years—
they are available only to those enrollees and not to
other beneficiaries, even though they are funded out of
general program funds.
It should be noted that while “bid” is the term
the MMA uses for the amount submitted by each MA
plan, it may not be just any amount the plan prefers
but must be calculated by following the detailed
“Instructions for Completing the Medicare Advantage
Bid Pricing Tool.”21 The bid may thus be viewed
as a kind of Medicare cost report for MA plans,
and it is auditable by the Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services.
Under this bidding mechanism, plans generally
receive payments in excess of their estimated cost of
providing traditional Medicare benefits to their enrollees. Because of this, the average bid submitted by
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plans has tended to drift upward over time. In 2009,
the average MA plan bid was approximately 102 percent of the corresponding Medicare fee-for-service
costs in the plan’s service areas, although these bids
varied considerably across types of plans: for health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), the average bid
was 98 percent of local fee-for-service costs; for
private fee-for-service plans, the average bid was 113
percent of local fee-for-service costs.22
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Variation in Extra Payments in 2009
The overall pattern of Medicare extra payments to MA
plans in 2009 can be discerned by focusing on plans
located in counties with three types of MA plan payments.
“Large Urban Floor” Counties. The largest aggregate amount of extra payments goes to MA plans in
the counties in which the large urban floor benchmark
determines the MA payment rates. The extra payments
received by MA plans in these counties amount to
approximately $6 billion, or 53 percent of the $11.4
billion in total extra payments in 2009. Extra payments
to plans in these counties are estimated to average
$1,361, or 17 percent, more per plan enrollee than the
same person would be expected to cost under traditional fee-for-service Medicare.
“100 Percent of Fee-for-Service” Counties. In the
counties where MA payments are determined by the
100-percent-of-fee-for-service benchmark, total extra
payments are estimated at over $3.4 billion, accounting
for 30 percent of total extra payments nationwide. This
seemingly anomalous finding—payments based on
100 percent of fee-for-service costs exceeding fee-forservice costs—is the result of three of the policies
described above, which add to MA payments relative
to patient care costs under traditional Medicare:
•

First, the BNRA policy adds 0.9 percent to the
MA benchmarks in every county in 2009.

•

Second, the inclusion of the IME payment to
MA plans adds 2.2 percent, on average, to those
benchmarks.

Third, and most important in this context, the
MA rebasing policy (the addition of new base
years for determining 100 percent of fee-forservice costs) has a “ratchet up but never down”
component. This means that the addition of new
base years may increase rates in some counties,
but it never reduces them. Under this policy,
plans in counties in which fee-for-service costs
are increasing at a slower rate that the national
average are paid at 100 percent of their local
fee-for-service costs in an earlier base year,
with that rate updated to 2009 using the higher
national rate of increase. The MA county benchmarks have been rebased in 2004, 2005, 2007,
and 2009. The Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) has estimated that eliminating the onesided rebasing process for MA benchmarks
would reduce Medicare spending by $61 billion
over 10 years.23

Rural Counties. Despite the initial concern in 1997
over low MA payment rates in rural counties—which
led to the implementation of the rural floor policy—
MA extra payments do not flow disproportionately to
Medicare plans in rural areas. While 18.9 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries live in counties where MA payment rates are determined by the rural floor benchmark, in 2009 only $1.3 billion, or 11 percent, of MA
extra payments go to plans in these counties. (The distribution of MA extra payments and enrollees by payment category is displayed in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.)
Extra payments to MA plans in 2009 vary greatly
by state (see Appendix Table 3). Three patterns of MA
extra payments across states are particularly important:
•

First, the states with the greatest extra payments
per MA enrollee are, due to the urban floor policy, generally the ones with the lowest per capita fee-for-service costs. While Virginia’s
Medicare fee-for-service costs are 14 percent
below the national average, Florida’s are 12
percent above.24
Although this relationship might appear to
reduce the discrepancy between high- and
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low-cost states, it actually provides a perverse
incentive for beneficiaries in states with low
fee-for-service costs to leave traditional
Medicare while failing to provide the same
attractive bonus for beneficiaries to enroll in
plans in states with high fee-for-service costs.
Plans in states where fee-for-service costs are
already low thus are disproportionately
rewarded by these extra payments, compared
with plans in high-cost states. In fact, many of
the states with low fee-for-service costs already
have a high managed-care presence. Hawaii and
Oregon, for example, are states where Kaiser
Permanente has been a major presence for the
60 years since the formation of the insurance
plan after World War II.
•

Second, the total amount of extra payments to
MA plans is highly concentrated among a relatively small number of states. In 2009,
California and New York accounted for over
one-fourth of total extra payments, and more
than half went to plans in six states. By contrast, the 30 states with the lowest total extra
payments together accounted for just 15 percent
of those payments.

•

Third, after 11 years of MA rural floor payments in excess of 100 percent of average feefor-service costs, fewer than 15 percent of
Medicare beneficiaries in rural counties are
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The MMA increased MA payment rates beginning in
March 2004. Since then, MA payment benchmarks
have exceeded costs in traditional fee-for-service
Medicare for every plan in every county in the nation.
The annual amount of these extra payments has
increased from $3.9 billion in 2004 to $11.4 billion in
2009 (Figure 1), with a cumulative six-year cost of
$44 billion.
Total extra payments have increased because of
growth in the amount of extra payments per MA plan
enrollee and growth in the total number of enrollees:
•

Extra payments per enrollee were $795, or 11.9
percent above fee-for-service costs in 2004, rose
to $1,037, or 14.1 percent above fee-for-service
costs in 2006, and are at $1,138, or 13 percent
above fee-for-service costs in 2009 (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Trends in Average Extra Payment per
Medicare Advantage (MA) Plan Enrollee, 2004–2009
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Sources: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) Medicare Advantage enrollment and payment rate data for 2004–2009,
and Medicare Payment Advisory Commission analysis of MA plan bids for 2006–2009.
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Figure 1. Trends in Total Extra Payments
to Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans, 2004–2009

enrolled in MA plans in 2009, compared with
nearly 25 percent of beneficiaries in urban
counties. Thirty-five years of national experience with HMOs and managed care plans indicates that private managed care plans have generally located and attracted enrollees in urban
areas. This pattern is evident in commercial
health insurance and Medicare. Moreover, MA
plans that do operate in rural areas tend to be
more expensive to Medicare than the fee-forservice program.25
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Services (CMS) MA enrollment and payment rate data for 2004–2009, and Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission analysis of MA plan bids for 2006–2009.
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Figure 3. Enrollment in Medicare Managed Care Plans
as Percentage of Total Medicare Beneficiaries, 1995–2009
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Meanwhile, the number of Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MA plans has increased from
4.8 million in 2004, or 13 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries, to over 10 million in February
2009, or 23 percent of Medicare beneficiaries
(Figure 3).

The CBO has attributed the increase in MA
enrollment to the extra payments received by MA
plans. They projected in 2007 that a policy of paying
MA plans at 100 percent of fee-for-service costs at the
county level—that is, of eliminating the extra payments—would reduce projected MA enrollment in
2012 from 12.5 million to 6.2 million Medicare beneficiaries, a number only slightly higher than MA
enrollment in 2005.26 The CBO also estimated in
December 2008 that the resulting reduction in Medicare
spending would total $55 billion over the five years
from 2010 through 2014, and $157 billion over the 10
years from 2010 through 2019 (Figure 4).27

Conclusions
Current MA payment policies, enacted beginning with
the MMA in 2003, have spurred greater enrollment in
Medicare private plans at substantially higher costs to
Medicare. This is primarily due to extra payments—
payments in excess of Medicare fee-for-service
costs—going to private plans. In 2009, for each of the
10 million Medicare enrollees in managed care,
Medicare will spend an average of $1,138, or 13
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Source: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare and Medicare managed
care enrollment data 1966-2001, 2002-2009. Data for 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2008 are for
the quarters ending in December of those years. Data for 2009 are as of February 2009.
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Figure 4. Estimated Savings from Implementation of Policy to
Reduce Payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans to
100 Percent of Fee-for-Service Costs, 2010–2019
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Source: George Washington University estimates, based on Congressional Budget Office,
Budget Options, Volume 1: Health Care (CBO, Dec. 2008), p.119.

percent, more than it would for comparable beneficiaries in traditional fee-for-service Medicare, with extra
payments to MA plans totaling $11.4 billion.
These extra payments vary widely across geographic areas: the average annual amount per MA
enrollee by state ranges from $2,521, or 38 percent
above average fee-for-service costs, in Hawaii, to
$159, or 2 percent above average fee-for-service costs,
in Nevada.
Overall, extra payments to MA private plans
have increased Medicare costs by $44 billion in the six
years since the MMA was implemented. Even with the
changes enacted in 2008 as part of MIPPA, the CBO
projects that MA extra payments will add more than
$150 billion to Medicare costs over the next 10 years.
The initial rationale for paying Medicare more
than costs in fee-for-service—to bring plans to rural
areas and benefits to rural beneficiaries—has not been
borne out. Ten years after the rural payment floor was
established by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, payments of 14 percent above average fee-for-services
costs have resulted in the enrollment of only 15 percent of rural beneficiaries in MA plans. Counties
where the rural floor applies contain 19 percent of
total Medicare beneficiaries but receive only 11 percent of extra payments, because the vast majority of
their beneficiaries, 85 percent, remain in traditional
Medicare. Moreover, the MA plans in those areas tend
to be more expensive than traditional fee-for-service
Medicare. If the goal of special policies for rural areas
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is to improve health services to the elderly and disabled who live in those areas, redirecting the $1.3 billion a year in extra payments away from rural MA
plans to increase payments to rural physicians and
hospitals would be a more effective—and far more
equitable—approach.
The projected $150 billion-plus in extra payments nationwide over the next 10 years could similarly be better used. In Medicare, these funds could
help offset the costs of benefit improvements for lowincome beneficiaries, such as reducing Part B premiums, increasing eligibility for low-income subsidies in
Medicare Part D, or reducing Part D copayments. The
$150 billion could also offset part of the more than
$1.2 trillion projected 10-year cost of expanding health
insurance to 47 million uninsured Americans.
Given the positions taken by the Obama campaign and comments by the president since the election—that Medicare private plans should be paid the
same as costs in traditional fee-for-service Medicare—
future analysis of MA plan payments may focus on the

most equitable way to make those payments more
comparable to Medicare fee-for-service costs. While
Medicare plan payments have been based on fee-forservice costs at the county level since 1992, there has
been discussion of new rates based on a blend of
national and local county fee-for-service costs, or on
broad metropolitan area and state average costs. These
payment policies would result in some plans continuing to be paid more than local fee-for-service costs,
while others would be paid less than costs in the
county. Such a policy could be used to provide
increased incentives for private plans to reduce costs
in high-cost areas. But it would have to be structured
in a way that allows private plans to better accomplish
their intended role—to develop innovations in quality,
efficiency, and patient service; to spur traditional
Medicare to better performance; and to offer
beneficiaries a choice of the best of both worlds.
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Appendix Table 1. Estimated Extra Payments in 2009, by County Payment Category,
to Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans Relative to Average Fee-for-Service (FFS) Costs1
Average MA Plan Payment Greater
than FFS Costs2,3

County
Payment Type

Total Annual
Extra Payments
to MA Plans
(millions)

Average Extra
Amount per MA
Plan Enrollee

Average Extra Payment
to MA Plans Greater than
FFS Costs

Medicare
Beneficiaries4

MA Plan
5
Enrollees

44,575,208

10,014,280

$11,396

$1,138

13.0%

Rural Floor

8,402,542

1,230,122

1,282

1,042

13.9%

Urban Floor

17,801,463

4,412,726

6,004

1,361

16.8%

Blend

419,735

138,824

238

1,714

20.8%

Minimum Update

886,265

228,259

422

1,850

18.5%

100% FFS 20046

11,579,729

2,869,501

2,873

1,001

10.6%

100% FFS 2005 6

2,467,028

432,088

364

842

8.8%

100% FFS 20076

1,870,204

374,959

305

813

8.1%

100% FFS 20096

1,148,242

327,801

-92

-281

-2.2%

National

Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released
February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
1

Payments to MA plans include the cost of indirect medical education payments and a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.009.

2

Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans.

3

In 2006 and future years, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to
one that combines county benchmarks with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75 percent of the difference between the county
benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan and 25 percent to the federal government if the plan’s bid falls below the benchmark. If the plan’s bid lies above the benchmark, the
plan is paid the benchmark, and plan enrollees pay the difference between the benchmark and the plan bid in the form of premiums. Analysts at the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that, for 2009, the average MA plan bid is approximately 16 percent less than
the county benchmark. This would result in average MA plan payments equal to a 4 percent reduction from the county benchmark. The above calculations account for the fact
that average MA plan bids fall 16 percent below the 2009 MA benchmark rates. See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Medicare Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public
Meeting, Dec. 5, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2008).
4

Medicare beneficiary totals as of February 2009. Calculations exclude Medicare beneficiaries in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

5

Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2009. Calculations exclude MA enrollees in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

6

CMS decided to rebase the 100 percent of FFS rate at the county level in 2005, 2007, and 2009. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per capita FFS
expenditures for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The MMA provided that the county-level payment rate for MA
plans in 2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6 percent. See: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to
Medicare Advantage Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates
(Washington, D.C.: CMS, March 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004.
For 2007, the county-level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1 percent. See: Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact
Sheet (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
For 2009, the county-level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2009 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2008 rate increased by 4.24 percent. See: Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations, Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors, and Other Interested Parties. Subject: Announcement of Calendar
Year 2009 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2009.pdf.
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Appendix Table 2. 2009 Distributions, by County Payment Category, of Medicare Beneficiaries, Medicare
Advantage (MA) Plan Enrollees, MA Enrollment Rates, and Estimated Extra Payments to MA Plans
Distribution
of Medicare
Beneficiaries

Distribution
of MA Plan Enrollees

MA Plan Enrollment
Rate

Distribution
of MA Plan
Extra Payments

100.0%

100.0%

22.5%

100.0%

Rural Floor

18.9%

12.3%

14.6%

11.3%

Urban Floor

39.9%

44.1%

24.8%

52.7%

0.9%

1.4%

33.1%

2.1%

Minimum Update

2.0%

2.3%

25.8%

3.7%

100% FFS 2004

1

26.0%

28.7%

24.8%

25.2%

100% FFS 2005

1

5.5%

4.3%

17.5%

3.2%

100% FFS 2007

1

4.2%

3.7%

20.0%

2.7%

100% FFS 2009

1

2.6%

3.3%

28.5%

-0.8%

County
Payment Type
National

Blend

Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released
February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
1

CMS decided to rebase the 100 percent of fee-for-service (FFS) rate at the county level in 2005, 2007, and 2009. Rebasing the FFS rates means that CMS retabulated the per
capita FFS expenditures for each county so that the FFS rates reflected more recent county growth trends in FFS expenditures. The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA)
provided that the county-level payment rate for MA plans in 2005 be the higher of the 2005 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2004 rate increased by 6.6 percent. See:
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations and Other Interested Parties: Advance Notice of Methodological Changes for Calendar
Year (CY) 2005 Medicare Advantage Payment Rates (Washington, D.C.: CMS, March 26, 2004), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/
Advance2005.pdf, accessed Sept. 15, 2004.
For 2007, the county level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2007 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2006 rate increased by 7.1 percent. See: Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Announcement of Calendar Year (CY) 2007 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies Fact
Sheet (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 3, 2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/factsheet2007.pdf, accessed May 30, 2006.
For 2009, the county level payment rate for MA plans was the higher of the 2009 rebased 100 percent of FFS rate or the 2008 rate increased by 4.24 percent. See: Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations, Prescription Drug Plan Sponsors, and Other Interested Parties. Subject: Announcement of Calendar
Year 2009 Medicare Advantage Capitation Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies (Washington, D.C.: CMS, April 2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Announcement2009.pdf.
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Appendix Table 3. Estimated Extra Payments to Medicare Advantage (MA) Plans in 2009
Compared with Average Fee-for-Service (FFS) Costs, by State1
Average MA Plan Payment
Greater than FFS Costs2,3

State
National
6

Rural

6

Urban

Alabama

Medicare
Beneficiaries4

MA Plan
Enrollees5

MA Plan
Enrollment Rate

Average
Extra Amount
per MA Plan
Enrollee

Total Extra
Payments to
MA Plans
(millions)

Average Extra
Payment to MA
Plans Greater
than FFS
Costs

44,575,208

10,014,280

22.5%

$1,138

$11,396

13.0%

13,413,831

1,887,657

14.1%

969

1,828

12.2%

31,151,025

8,126,490

26.1%

1,177

9,567

13.2%

813,060

170,929

21.0%

842

144

9.8%

Alaska

60,875

640

1.1%

1,218

1

13.7%

Arizona

876,576

323,823

36.9%

856

277

10.1%

Arkansas

511,604

67,808

13.3%

1,106

75

14.0%

California

4,528,527

1,570,931

34.7%

1,107

1,739

12.0%

Colorado

585,726

173,014

29.5%

974

168

11.5%

Connecticut

550,462

87,916

16.0%

605

53

6.7%

Delaware

141,606

6,627

4.7%

719

5

8.6%

75,338

3,244

4.3%

1,745

6

19.1%

Florida

3,226,443

922,369

28.6%

310

286

3.0%

Georgia

1,165,638

169,945

14.6%

1,127

192

13.8%

Hawaii

195,961

37,902

19.3%

2,521

96

37.8%

Idaho

216,070

57,219

26.5%

1,516

87

20.2%

Illinois

1,781,355

168,079

9.4%

696

117

7.9%

Indiana

967,042

132,303

13.7%

1,281

169

16.3%

Iowa

506,384

56,193

11.1%

1,662

93

23.2%

Kansas

419,221

40,914

9.8%

1,210

49

14.8%

Kentucky

731,038

103,977

14.2%

975

101

12.0%

Louisiana

660,165

146,528

22.2%

1,699

249

17.1%

Maine

254,820

23,921

9.4%

1,574

38

21.5%

Maryland

748,964

36,215

4.8%

425

15

4.3%

Massachusetts

1,022,653

195,785

19.1%

1,130

221

12.7%

Michigan

1,586,269

380,956

24.0%

832

317

9.7%

Minnesota

753,649

175,517

23.3%

737

129

8.8%

Mississippi

480,458

43,827

9.1%

745

33

8.3%

Missouri

969,993

190,434

19.6%

1,344

256

16.7%

Montana

161,569

27,046

16.7%

1,153

31

15.6%

Nebraska

272,077

29,612

10.9%

1,088

32

13.7%

Nevada

333,754

102,927

30.8%

159

16

1.6%

New Hampshire

206,719

12,229

5.9%

1,212

15

15.2%

New Jersey

1,286,869

152,989

11.9%

810

124

8.7%

New Mexico

296,739

71,462

24.1%

2,211

158

31.8%

2,901,918

822,535

28.3%

1,682

1,383

18.7%

D.C.

New York
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Average MA Plan Payment
Greater than FFS Costs2,3
Total Extra
Payments to
MA Plans
(millions)

Average Extra
Payment to MA
Plans Greater
than FFS
Costs

MA Plan
Enrollees5

MA Plan
Enrollment Rate

1,412,487

244,055

17.3%

1,436

350

18.4%

106,505

6,984

6.6%

1,328

9

18.4%

1,842,533

471,989

25.6%

1,166

551

14.3%

Oklahoma

581,751

83,262

14.3%

513

43

5.6%

Oregon

588,158

244,823

41.6%

1,767

433

23.7%

Pennsylvania

2,226,572

842,648

37.8%

1,167

984

13.7%

Rhode Island

178,103

64,713

36.3%

1,609

104

20.6%

South Carolina

727,532

105,515

14.5%

1,189

125

14.9%

South Dakota

132,589

9,424

7.1%

1,320

12

18.2%

Tennessee

1,007,941

221,207

21.9%

1,046

231

12.7%

Texas

2,831,789

488,491

17.3%

1,550

757

16.1%

Utah

266,656

79,422

29.8%

1,320

105

16.7%

Vermont

105,684

3,800

3.6%

1,244

5

17.1%

1,087,696

132,793

12.2%

1,764

234

24.0%

Washington

910,452

215,825

23.7%

1,600

345

21.0%

West Virginia

373,490

73,546

19.7%

1,250

92

16.0%

Wisconsin

877,725

216,329

24.6%

1,551

336

20.8%

Wyoming

76,549

3,638

4.8%

784

3

9.8%

State
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

Virginia

Medicare
Beneficiaries4

Average
Extra Amount
per MA Plan
Enrollee

Source: George Washington University analysis of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) Medicare Managed Care State/County/Contract Data File, released
February 2009; Medicare Managed Care State/County Penetration Data File, released February 2009; and the Medicare Advantage 2009 Rate Calculation Data Spreadsheet.
1

Payments to MA plans include the cost of indirect medical education payments and a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.009.

2

Calculations at the county level, weighted by MA enrollment. Excludes MA enrollees in cost plans.

3

In 2006 and future years, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) provides that payments to MA plans change from a system based entirely on county benchmarks to
one that combines county benchmarks with a bid by each individual MA plan. The new benchmark-based bidding system allocates 75 percent of the difference between the county
benchmark and the MA plan bid to the plan and 25 percent to the federal government if the plan’s bid falls below the benchmark. If the plan’s bid lies above the benchmark, the
plan is paid the benchmark, and plan enrollees pay the difference between the benchmark and the plan bid in the form of premiums. Analysts at the Medicare Payment Advisory
Commission (MedPAC) who have studied Medicare private-plan payments and costs have found that, for 2009, the average MA plan bid is approximately 16 percent less than the
county benchmark. This would result in MA plan payments equal to a 4 percent reduction from the county benchmark. The above calculations account for the fact that average MA
plan bids fall 16 percent below the 2009 MA benchmark rates.
See: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Medicare Advantage Program,” MedPAC Public Meeting, Dec. 5, 2008 (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, 2008).
4

Medicare beneficiary totals as of February 2009. Calculations exclude Medicare beneficiaries in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

5

Medicare Advantage enrollment data as of February 2009. Calculations exclude MA enrollees in Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.

6

County designations from the 2005 American Community Survey.
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S tudy M ethods
This report’s 2009 analysis is based on Medicare Advantage payment rates and fee-for-service expenditure
averages posted by county in the 2009 Medicare Advantage Rate Calculation Data spreadsheet of the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).i The number of Medicare beneficiaries and Medicare Advantage
enrollees by county is taken from the CMS State/County Penetration Data file and the CMS State/County/Contract
Data file for February 2009. These data are posted on the CMS Website, http://www.cms.hhs.gov.ii
The county is the basic unit of analysis, as Medicare sets MA plan payment rates at the county level. For 2009,
Medicare benchmark rates for MA plans in each county are set at the highest of eight different reference points:
a floor rate for counties in large urban areas; a floor rate for other counties; a blended rate (consisting of 50 percent
of the county-specific base MA payment rate and 50 percent of the national average base MA payment rate); a
minimum update over the previous year’s payment rate; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per capita fee-forservice costs in the county in 2004, trended forward to 2009; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per capita
fee-for-service costs in the county in 2005, trended forward to 2009; a payment rate equal to 100 percent of per
capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2007, trended forward to 2009; or a payment rate equal to 100 percent
of per capita fee-for-service costs in the county in 2009. The MMA provides for the annual minimum increase in
MA plan payments to be the Medicare national growth-rate percentage in fee-for-service expenditures, which is
4.24 percent for 2009.
Extra payments to Medicare Advantage plans are calculated for each of the more than 3,000 counties in the United
States in 2009. Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands are not included in the analysis. All
calculations are MA plan enrollee-weighted to reflect variations in enrollment and payment rates.
Over 300,000 MA enrollees are in Medicare “cost” plans, paid on the basis of costs. Although these beneficiaries
(identified through the CMS Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data file for February 2009) receive
Medicare benefits through managed-care plans, they do not generate extra payments based on MA plan payment
rates.iii Cost beneficiaries were removed from the Medicare Advantage enrollee totals by county, but are included
in the number of overall Medicare beneficiaries.
This analysis follows a methodological convention developed by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission
(MedPAC) in addressing the Medicare policy of making direct payments to teaching hospitals for the costs of
indirect medical education (IME) for MA enrollees. MedPAC adjusts fee-for-service costs at the county level by
removing the average IME expense. This is done by deflating the county fee-for-service average by a factor of
1–(0.65 x GME), where GME is the county graduate medical education carve-out, and 0.65 represents the national
average percentage of GME payments that goes to IME; county-specific data are unavailable. Because Medicare
makes IME payments directly to teaching hospitals for patients who are enrolled in Medicare Advantage, MA plan
payment rates are most appropriately compared with fee-for-service costs adjusted in this manner.iv
Budget-neutral risk adjustments to 2009 payments to Medicare Advantage plans provide additional extra payments
to MA plans. This analysis of extra payments includes a budget-neutral risk adjustment of 1.009 for 2009.v
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Notes to Study Methods
i

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Rate Calculation Data Risk 2009 spreadsheet (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, April
2008), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/.

ii

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Monthly Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data and Monthly
Medicare Advantage State/County Penetration Data (Baltimore, Md.: CMS, Feb. 2009), available at http://www.cms.hhs.
gov/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/.

iii

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Monthly Medicare Advantage State/County/Contract Data.

iv

Alternatively, indirect medical education amounts may be added to Medicare Advantage payment rates, and these
adjusted rates are directly compared with published fee-for-service spending averages. The two methods have extremely
similar results.

v

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Note to Medicare Advantage Organizations, Prescription Drug Plan
Sponsors, and Other Interested Parties. Subject: Announcement of Calendar Year 2009 Medicare Advantage Capitation
Rates and Medicare Advantage and Part D Payment Policies.
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